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December 2020

### Administrative Appeal Decision - Davis, Rowland (2019-03-22)

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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE**

**Name:** Davis, Rowland

**Facility:** Otisville CF

**NYSID:** [REDACTED]

**Appeal  
Control No.:** 09-082-18 B

**DIN:** 93-A-5756

Appearances: Philip Schnabel Esq.  
33 Schnabel Lane  
Chester, New York 10918

Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months.


Board Member(s)  
who participated: Berliner, Crangle

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 15, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed ☐ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ☐ Modified to ☐  
Commissioner

 Affirmed ☒ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ☐ Modified to ☐  
Commissioner

 Affirmed ☒ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ☐ Modified to ☐  
Commissioner

**If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.**

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 3/22/19 bb.

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Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant raises the following claims: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. Appellant contends he is rehabilitated, but all the Board did was to look only at the instant offense/criminal history. 2) the Board never explained why some factors outweigh other factors. 3) the decision lacks details. 4) the Board failed to apply the proper standard. 5) the decision is in violation of the due process clause of the constitution. 6) the decision violated the 8<sup>th</sup> amendment to the constitution, as youth and its transient immaturity was not taken into consideration. 7) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive in that the COMPAS was ignored. Also, the Board failed to comply with its own regulation, which creates a constitutional legitimate expectation of early release, in that no reason for departing from the COMPAS is given.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018).

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Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight. Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may consider efforts undertaken to conceal the crime. See Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) (brutal crime involved dumping victim's weighted body in a river); Matter of Hynes v. Stanford, 2017 NY Slip Op 32322(U), 2017 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4195 (Sup. Ct. Seneca Co. Nov. 3, 2017) (after drowning girlfriend, inmate tried to cover up crime by burying her body); Matter of Benjamin v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 31546(U), 2016 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 3008 (Sup Ct. Franklin Co. Aug. 16, 2016) (Feldstein A.S.C.J.) (after shooting victim in head, inmate buried her in pig manure, built a deck over her and lived in her home); Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 1236A, 831 N.Y.S.2d 353, 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006) (aggravating factors identified include the imprisonment of the co-defendant's younger sister in an attempt to hide the crime).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal behavior. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The inmate may not review the Board's weighing process or assess whether the Board gave proper weight to the relevant factors, since it is not required to state each factor it considers, or weigh each factor equally or grant parole due to exemplary behavior. Comfort v New York State Division of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3<sup>rd</sup> Dept. 2009); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be

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second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

The Board provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. Compare Matter of Vaello v. Parole Bd. Div. of State of New York, 48 A.D.3d 1018, 1019, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746–47 (3d Dept. 2008) (annulling determination that did not identify any of the standards set forth in the statute but merely noted crimes and stated inmate was poor candidate for release), with Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011). That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.” Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).

“[D]enial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.” Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). “[D]enial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.” Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

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An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). Accordingly, appellant has no liberty interest in parole. Duемmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v Dennison, 219 Fed Appx 68 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. den. 552 U.S. 863, 128 S.Ct. 151, 169 L.ed2d 103 (2007); Rodriguez v Alexander, 71 A.D.3d 1354, 896 N.Y.S.2d 693 (3d Dept. 2010), lv. den. 15 N.Y.3d 703, 906 N.Y.S.2d 817. Thus, the protections of the due process clause are inapplicable. Barna v Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept 2005); Watson v New York State Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1367, 910 N.Y.S.2d 311 (3d Dept. 2010).

Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Duемmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, Matter of Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016) – which requires consideration of youth and its attendant characteristics for inmates serving a maximum life sentence for crimes committed as juveniles – does not apply whereas here the inmate was an adult when he committed the instant offense. Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017) (Hawkins inapplicable to offender who was over 18 at time of offense). Cf. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding unconstitutional mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juveniles under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (distinguishing juveniles under 18 from adults).

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Nothing in the Executive Law or current case law supports expanding minor offender consideration to young adults or to all minors without regard to sentence length.

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 Amendments and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime. Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). Thus, even where the First Department has "take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]", it has nonetheless reiterated that "[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight" and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize "factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors". Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

The COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. The 2011 amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). As such, "the Board adhered to the requirements of Executive Law § 259-c(4) in making its parole decision, which included consideration of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist in determining whether

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an inmate may be released to parole supervision.” Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016).

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). The 2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018).

The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. For example, the Board did not find a reasonable probability that Petitioner will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, *despite* low risk scores, release would be inappropriate under the deprecation standard. This is entirely consistent with the Board’s intention in enacting the amended regulation.

**Recommendation:** Affirm.